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Role of Remuneration Committee in Narrative Human capital Disclosure  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study empirically investigates whether independent directors on the remuneration 
committee influence narrative human capital disclosure (NAHCD) in firms where independent 
directors dominate the board composition. NAHCD is measured by frequency of occurrence, 
using latent content analysis in the annual reports of the top 30 listed firms on the Colombo 
Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2006. This study examines two attributes of corporate governance, 
controlling for other corporate governance attributes and firm-level attributes. The findings 
highlight the importance of considering a firm’s independent director involvement in the 
remuneration committee when determining NAHCD strategy.  
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
BOARD SIZE AND COMMITTEES, AND NARRATIVE HUMAN 
CAPITAL DISCLOSURE  
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose 
This study empirically examines whether independent directors on the remuneration 
committee affect narrative human capital disclosure (NAHCD) where independent directors 
dominate a firm’s board composition. The remuneration committee and the audit committee are 
the two committees most commonly mandated by the corporate governance codes applicable to 
listed firms across nations. This is particularly relevant to the contemporary global business 
context, as the ratio of independent to executive directors in listed firms has significantly 
increased in the past decades (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). However, independent directors’ 
influence in communicating information to shareholders about human capital of firms is largely 
unexplored. Investigation into independent directors’ participation in these two committees 
affect NAHCD is particularly important to the businesses, as businesses have a responsibility to 
inform shareholders about future earnings from their anecdotally most-valued asset of human 
capital. More specifically, this study adds to the knowledge of how corporate governance 
(specifically, the remuneration committee) influences NAHCD. To examine this relationship, 
this study investigates the NAHCD of the top 30 listed firms by market capitalization on the 
Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) in Sri Lanka over a nine-year period (from 1998 to 2006), using 
the corporate governance attributes identified by the Code of Best Practice on Corporate 
Governance in Sri Lanka. Shareholders consider these firms to set the best practice, and they 
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represent around 60% of the market capitalization of the CSE (CSE, 1999). The CSE introduced 
the Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance as a best-practice mandatory code (hereafter 
labelled “the best-practice code”) effective from 2008; hence, the study period pre-dates the 
introduction of the best-practice code.  
Importance of Sri Lanka  
An adult literacy rate of 90.8%, unusually high for a developing country, makes the best 
practice of Sri Lankan companies an interesting sample to examine NAHCD, as these companies 
are beneficiaries of this highly literate labour force. Furthermore, during this study period, Sri 
Lanka took several steps to drive its economy towards a private-sector-led, knowledge-based 
economy, enhancing the importance of human capital. These steps included amendments to the 
Code of Intellectual Property Act 1979 (Wickremaratne, 2000), identifying the human capital 
base in Sri Lanka as a major thrust area, and providing incentives to develop and protect 
intellectual property (BOI, 2000). The top 30 companies are some of the biggest employers of 
the Sri Lankan private sector, due to their size, and they depend greatly on their staff for 
commercial success. The prevailing civil war between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil 
separatists during the study period required companies to be more convincing to shareholders 
about future earnings, in order to sustain their interest, especially from a most-valued human 
capital base not captured in financial statements. The competitive advantage obtained from a 
highly literate, low-cost labour force in Sri Lanka enables firms to optimize profits and capital 
gains at a favourable advantage to both domestic and foreign investors. The findings of this study 
provide insights into the role of independent directors in providing NAHCD in an increasingly 
common board composition dominated by independent directors. This study also contributes to 
furthering the understanding of corporate governance practices related to NAHCD, a topic 
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seldom explored in listed firms. The study will facilitate comparison with the corporate 
governance attributes of firms in developed countries and in settings where boards have various 
proportions of independent director representation.  
Independent Directors 
Since the top 30 firms are visible targets for investors’ demands, the firms respond to 
these demands by including more independent
1
 directors with diverse business and communal 
skills on the board to enhance the firms’ prestige and legitimacy. The reputational effect of these 
independent directors has a positive association with the firms’ value, brings more investment 
opportunities, and enhances the perceived civic responsibility of firms (Ting, 2009). In this 
study, more than two-thirds of the directors on the boards are independent; that is, they are 
external to the firm. They bring a diverse range of skills to the firm, but lack firm-specific, 
detailed information due to their lack of daily involvement in the business. This study expects 
that a high proportion of independent directors make the board dependent on their involvement 
in the remuneration committee to obtain firm-specific, forward-looking, and value-relevant 
information. This is particularly relevant to NAHCD, which is comprised of non-measurable 
assets that are difficult for competitors to imitate and to which it is difficult to assign accurate 
financial values (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols, 2001). The independent directors sitting on the 
remuneration committee can obtain firm-specific, detailed human capital information and 
provide input to the board for NAHCD in annual reports. Although independent directors on the 
audit committee can provide a limited amount of firm-specific, forward-looking information on 
human capital, this study expects that independent directors on the remuneration committee 
acquire much of this knowledge. The larger boards can pool their expertise in making decisions 
                                                 
1
 In the Sri Lankan context independent directors are non-executive directors are interchangeable. 
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about this disclosure. In the absence of a remuneration committee, this study expects 
independent directors on the audit committee to become the sole providers of limited NAHCD.  
Consistent with the prediction, this study finds that independent directors on 
remuneration committees facilitate communication to boards regarding human capital. The 
proportion of independent directors on the board and the number of meetings has no influence on 
NAHCD. The monitoring role of the board in having more board meetings and resolving 
conflicting agendas between shareholders and management has little relevance for NAHCD.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the Sri Lankan 
context of corporate governance. Section 3 outlines the relevant literature and the resource 
dependence perspective. Section 4 develops the hypotheses. Section 5 details the research 
methods, sample selection, and the governance and disclosure measures employed in the 
empirical testing of this study. Section 6 presents the results and conclusions, including the 
impact of corporate governance attributes and control variables. 
 
SRI LANKAN CONTEXT  
Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) 
 The CSE in Sri Lanka differs greatly from stock exchanges in the developed world in 
terms of market capitalization, and foreign investment flows. The CSE, which is Sri Lanka’s 
only stock exchange, is of high national significance for economic growth. However, it is 
relatively a small capital market measured by market capitalization, and relies on foreign 
investors to maintain its liquidity and to bridge the gap between investments and savings (CSE, 
1997). The two indicators of market liquidity—market capitalization as a percentage of GDP 
(6.59% in 2002, 33% in 2006) and trade value as a percentage of market capitalization—reveal 
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that the CSE has the lowest liquidity level in the South Asian region (CSE, 1998: 10; De Silva, 
2006; World Bank, 2002). Market capitalization of the CSE in 2006 was around USD8 billion 
for the 237 listed firms (De Silva, 2006; Lanka Newspapers, 2005).  
Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka 
In 1997, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka established a voluntary code 
of corporate governance related to the financial aspects of firms. In 2002, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka established a code of best practice for audit committees. In 
2005, it joined with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka to develop the best-
practice code, in an effort to ensure that Sri Lankan standards of corporate governance were 
comparable to best practice elsewhere in the world (SECSL and ICASL, 2008; Wickramasinghe, 
2006). Until 2008, listed firms on the CSE self-regulated their corporate governance practices. 
The World Bank report on the observance of standards and codes in 2004 stated that the 
corporate accounting practices of firms in Sri Lanka had improved over the previous decade. 
This report cited the enactment of the Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act (1995) 
and the establishment of the Accounting and Auditing Standards Monitoring Board in 1995 as 
two positive actions taken towards furthering improvement of the quality of financial reporting. 
Among measures to ensure and strengthen regulatory capacity, the report stressed the urgent 
need for a system of independent oversight of the auditing profession to protect the public 
interest (ROSC, 2004).  
 The Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No. 15 of 1995 provides 
institutional arrangements for setting accounting and auditing standards and for monitoring their 
implementation in specific business enterprises. Specific business enterprises include all firms on 
stock exchanges, public firms, and other firms meeting specific criteria set forth in the 
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Companies Act of Sri Lanka (Companies Act, 1982). The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Sri Lanka is empowered to issue accounting and auditing standards applicable to specific 
business enterprises (Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act, 1995). Publicly trading 
firms in Sri Lanka are required to comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri 
Lanka Act No. 36 of 1987 (amended in 2003), which imposes additional rules and requirements, 
including compliance with accounting and auditing standards, to protect shareholders. The 
memorandum of understanding with the Accounting and Auditing Standards Monitoring Board 
requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to refer firms not complying with accounting 
and auditing standards to the monitoring board to determine further action. The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Sri Lanka publishes the accounting standards in the Government 
Gazette; once published, the standards become best-practice code for practising accountants and 
applicable firms (ROSC, 2004). Since 2006, Sri Lanka has adopted and implemented 
international accounting standards in full to establish global comparability of financial reporting.  
 As the private sector is the major engine of growth in the Sri Lankan economy, the best-
practice code is a response to corporate collapses that were taking place in major developed 
economies, to protect shareholders of the listed firms on the CSE and to sustain Sri Lanka’s 
economic growth. While offering directors the freedom to make business decisions, the intention 
of the best-practice code is that directors exercise that freedom within a framework that ensures 
accountability and transparency for the best interests of the stakeholders, particularly 
shareholders (Wickramasinghe, 2006). The best-practice code recommends at least two board-
appointed committees: the audit committee and the remuneration committee.  
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Narrative Disclosure 
 Construction of narrative disclosure is a board-approved activity, enabling directors to 
provide reasons for their decisions. The use of NAHCD serves not only to help shareholders 
understand management activity but also to signal future board action and organizational change 
(Dumay, 2008). Although not referring explicitly to human capital, research on narrative 
disclosure has produced mixed results, some suggesting that narrative disclosure assists in 
improving the stock return (Schleicher, Hussainey, and Walker, 2007), whereas other studies 
conclude that it has little impact on investment decisions (Milne and Chan, 1999). There is, 
however, agreement that narrative is a powerful way to communicate meaning clearly to 
stakeholders (Weick, 1995, pp. 128–129), that the constructive potential of its messages is well-
known (Yolles, 2007), and that it is a mechanism for understanding human capital (Mouritsen, 
Bukh, Larsen, and Johansen, 2001; Mouritsen, Larsen, and Bukh, 2001).  
 Surveying the Fortune 500 firms, a PricewaterhouseCoopers study (2007) finds that even 
the most technically astute investing community has difficulty understanding the performance 
disclosure in financial statements in corporate annual reports. Additionally, narrative disclosure 
contributes to the transparency and understandability of current financial reporting, and to 
increased dialogue between shareholders and firms—the two key players in capital markets.  
Human Capital and NAHCD 
Human capital takes the broad view that intangibles have economic value for the firm. 
Human capital can be conceptualized in various ways; in this study, human capital refers to a 
combination of factors possessed by a firm’s staff individually and collectively. It can comprise 
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knowledge, skills, and technical ability; personal traits such as intelligence, energy, attitude, 
reliability, and commitment; ability to learn, including aptitude, imagination, and creativity; and 
desire to share information, participate in a team, and focus on the goals of the firm (Fitz-enz, 
2000). 
The relevance of NAHCD for forward-looking decision-making finds major consensus 
among many academicians and shareholders (Beattie, 1999; Lev, 2001). Shareholders are the 
ultimate owners of the firm, and directors execute accountability with NAHCD to shareholders 
about future earnings to improve market efficiency (Grojer, 2001; Walker, 2006). The value of 
human capital as a collection of intangibles is documented as a compelling case for its disclosure 
(Lev and Zambon, 2003). Abdel-Khalik (2003) uses executive directors on the board and 
considers them as employees, demonstrating that shareholders recognize the value of human 
capital, measured as incentive pay per dollar of fixed salary, as a surrogate for skills embodied in 
directors. Several factors influence a firm’s NAHCD, and there is evidence that corporate 
governance practice is one such factor. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) in relation to human 
capital, and Li, Pike, and Haniffa (2008) in relation to intellectual capital, found that board size, 
proportion of independent directors, role of the chairperson, and audit committee composition 
influenced a firm’s disclosure. A point of difference is that Li et al. (2008) used a sample in 
which executive directors comprised more than one-half of the board, whereas Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007) did not provide details of the board composition in their sample. 
Previous research has mostly examined the governance aspects of firms’ physical and 
financial capital, rather than their human capital (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001). There is, 
however, a growing understanding that human capital is important in creating and strengthening 
the financial capital of firms as future earnings. Thus, as part of good governance practice, firms 
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are obliged to communicate with shareholders about the competitive advantage of this relatively 
hidden capital base (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001; Sullivan, 1998). Specifically, this study 
focuses on the use of narrative, which is the predominant type of human capital disclosure of 
firms. Li et al. (2008) find that 72% of human capital disclosure is narrative in annual reports for 
a sample of 100 UK listed companies. Analysis of 253 observations in this study confirms that 
narrative is the predominant human capital disclosure, compared with visual human capital 
disclosure and numerical human capital disclosure. Given that little is known about who is 
behind the NAHCD in firms, this study investigates the governance attributes—specifically, 
independent directors on the remuneration committee—and their relationship to NAHCD. 
Evidence provides important insights for businesses to identify the specific roles played by 
independent directors on the remuneration committee for NAHCD. 
NAHCD 
 Consideration of NAHCD as an outcome of sound corporate governance is compelling, 
in light of evidence that lack of such disclosure can lead to shareholders underestimating future 
earnings and firms’ increasing their cost of capital (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 2001). 
Higher levels of discretionary NAHCD can reduce the risk level perceived by shareholders and 
reduce information asymmetry between shareholders who have access to companies’ private 
information and those who do not (Zhang, 2001). Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) used a sample 
of biotechnology firms in the European Union to investigate NAHCD as a component in their 
studies of intellectual-capital disclosure and the influence of corporate governance attributes. 
They reviewed the management discussion and analysis section of annual reports. They found 
corporate governance attributes strongly influenced the disclosure quality and quantity.  The 
present study, however, investigates the top listed companies considered the standard-setters of 
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best practice, and is a longitudinal study over nine years. As noted earlier in this paper, in 
contrast with the previous two studies—Li et al. (2008) and Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007)—this 
study focuses on boards dominated by independent directors.  
Resource Dependence Theory 
Rather than dichotomizing directors as executive and independent, the resource 
dependence theory views the entire board as a mechanism that manages to reduce external 
uncertainties (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Firms reduce uncertainties by effective selection of 
resources and strategies to increase survival likelihood (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986). This 
resource selection includes acquiring independent directors, and strategies include discretionary 
NAHCD. In addition to reducing uncertainty in firms, directors bring resources such as 
information, skills, and legitimacy (Hillman, Canella, and Paetzold, 2000). Independent 
directors, an external resource procured by firms, are business experts and influential figures in 
the community (Hillman et al., 2000). Such independent directors heavily dominate the top 30 
Sri Lankan boards, as a way to respond to potential environmental demands of the businesses. 
These environmental demands include greater transparency in discretionary disclosure to inform 
about future earnings to shareholders. The involvement of independent directors in remuneration 
committees enables them to obtain firm-specific information, independently evaluate the 
relevance of this information to the firm value, and inform the board. The result is that firms are 
able to communicate independently evaluated firm-specific information to gain credibility 
among shareholders. However, the entire board responds to environmental demands, and 
effectively functioning boards have an optimal number of representatives to respond with value-
relevant NAHCD to meet investor expectations. The boards in this study are comprised of a large 
proportion of independent—rather than executive—directors. This study takes the view that 
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boards act collectively to determine disclosure decisions and those independent directors on the 
audit and remuneration committees help the board as providers of NAHCD information. The 
independent directors in remuneration committees are essential as regards the depth and breadth 
of NAHCD recommended to the board, and the board is important as the ‘gatekeeper’ of 
NAHCD to shareholders.  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Dependent Variable (NAHCD) 
This study examines the role of corporate governance attributes in the best-practice code 
on NAHCD. The NAHCD is constructed for each firm as the total frequency (i.e., number of 
times) of human capital disclosed in a firm’s annual report. Outlined below are the governance 
attributes included in this study and the hypotheses developed.  
 
Predictor Variables 
Proportion of independent directors on the board (B-BALANCE). The best-practice 
code requires that at least 2 or one-third of the total directors on the board—whichever is 
greater—should be independent directors, and that independent directors must declare their 
independence at least annually, based on criteria set by the best-practice code. Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007) demonstrate a positive association between independent directors and human 
capital disclosure with European biotechnology firms as a way of reducing agency conflicts, but 
admit that a sound corporate governance system characterizes the involvement of independent 
directors in board-appointed committees. Not focusing on the agency conflicts but consistent 
with Cerbioni and Parbonetti’s admission, this study using the resource-dependence perspective 
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takes the view that independent directors on board-appointed committees add value to the board 
by helping the board to respond to investor demands with firm-specific discretionary disclosure, 
such as NAHCD. Hence, this study expects a positive association to exist between the proportion 
of independent directors and NAHCD.  
 
H1: The proportion of independent directors on the board has a positive influence on the 
NAHCD level. 
 
Number of independent directors on the remuneration committee (N-IDIR-RCOM). 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti’s (2007) remark that it is the involvement of independent directors on 
board-appointed committees rather than their mere representation on the board that leads to a 
sound corporate governance system. Early studies in the UK indicate that there is no association 
between remuneration committees and management pay, in an era where the highest paid 
executives are usually members of the remuneration committee (Main and Johnston, 1993). 
Since the publication of the Cadbury report in 1992, which made recommendations on corporate 
governance risks and failures, Conyon and Peck (1998) demonstrate that among other things, the 
remuneration committee has established transparency in setting the remuneration of senior 
executives. They find that the presence of a remuneration committee with independent directors 
enables UK firms to align management compensation with firm performance. Their findings lend 
to the argument that independent directors’ informing the board about human capital activities 
helps the board to inform shareholders about future earnings through NAHCD, and thereby bring 
forward future earnings into the current period to increase stock return. The best-practice code 
assumes that the remuneration committee is involved in making decisions about forward-looking 
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activities rather than monitoring historical activities. The best-practice code also requires the 
remuneration committee to make recommendations to the board regarding the content to be 
included in the annual report related to remuneration and human-resource matters. Using the 
resource-dependence perspective, this study recognizes the involvement of independent directors 
in the remuneration committee as a resource that acquires firm-specific, forward-looking value-
creation possibilities through the firm’s human capital, and helps inform the board to determine 
NAHCD. The greater involvement of independent directors increases the resource level of 
facilitating the board with the depth and breadth of human capital information for NAHCD, thus 
this study expects a strong, positive association between the two. 
 
H2: The independent directors on the remuneration committee have a positive influence on the 
NAHCD level. 
 
Control Variables 
Board size (B-SIZE). Despite the assumption that the board of directors is interested in 
the long-term value of the firm (Laux and Laux, 2009), there is no consensus in the literature as 
to the recommended optimal size of the board. Jensen (1993) suggested that 8 is the optimal 
number.  Yermack (1996) found that firms’ market value decreases with larger boards, but 
Belkhir (2009) found that larger boards increase firm performance. The Olivencia report in Spain 
suggested that the optimal number of directors for an effective board should be between 5 and 15 
(Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva, 2007). The best-practice code specifies that a board 
should have a minimum of 2 directors but does not specify the maximum. Rather, it states that 
the number of directors at the preceding annual general meeting should be the basis for 
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determining the total number of directors. However, there is a common agreement among studies 
that excessively large boards can become dysfunctional, and from a resource-dependence 
perspective, boards of optimal size use the board resources effectively to make better collective 
decisions. Combining the previous findings on optimal board size, this study sets a maximum 
limit of 14 directors for an effective board size with a mean value of 8, and expects effective 
boards to make more NAHCD.  
Number of independent directors on the audit committee (N-IDIR-ACOM). The 
findings from literature concerning the influence of the number of independent directors on the 
audit committee on the NAHCD level are conflicting. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) examine 
the majority presence of independent directors in committees (audit, nomination, and 
remuneration) as a single variable and find a positive association with human capital disclosure 
in European biotechnology firms. Their study however does not identify the association between 
each committee separately and the human capital disclosure. The audit committee’s 
responsibilities include making adequate disclosure in financial statements, assessing and 
managing risk, disclosing risk-management activities in financial statements, and conducting 
matters related to the hiring of auditors (Laux and Laux, 2009). McMullen (1996) finds that audit 
committees help to enhance reliable financial reporting, and Ho and Wong (2001) find that audit 
committees help to increase firms’ quality of financial reporting.  
The Financial Reporting Council (2010) identifies the primary role of the audit 
committee as ensuring that the interests of shareholders are protected through financial 
disclosure and internal control. In relation to voluntary disclosure, Li et al. (2008) find that the 
audit committee size positively influences the intensity of intellectual capital disclosure, but find 
no relationship with intellectual capital disclosure as a proportion of the total corporate 
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disclosure in annual reports. Audit committees are likely to obtain a very little firm-specific 
knowledge about human capital resource items, since these items are not a routine audit function 
and human capital-related activities are usually outside the purview of the audit committee. 
The best-practice code identifies the roles of the audit committee as reviewing the scope 
and result of an audit and its effectiveness, and the independence and objectivity of the auditors. 
The best-practice code notes that the audit committee should meet relevant financial-reporting 
requirements, and that it can play a vital role in historical and financial disclosure. The code also 
recommends that at least 50% of the directors on the audit committee should be independent, and 
that an independent director should be the chairperson. Using a resource-dependence theoretical 
underpinning, this study recognizes that the involvement of independent directors is a resource 
helping the board by informing on matters mainly relating to financial reporting rather than non-
financial reporting.  
Number of board meetings (N-MEET). The number of board meetings is a proxy for 
the level of monitoring, to indicate the monitoring effectiveness of the board (Vafeas, 1999). The 
best-practice code requires boards to meet at least four times a year. Since the input of 
information about NAHCD is expected to be determined by the level of involvement of 
independent directors on the remuneration committee and the decisions to disclose NAHCD are 
determined by the proportion of independent directors on the board, this study expects that the 
number of board meetings will have little influence on NAHCD.  
The firm characteristics influence the level of corporate governance; hence this study 
includes firm size, level of growth, and level of debt, using the findings of previous research.  
Size of the firm (SIZE). Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Meek, Roberts, and Gray 
(1995) find that the size of the firm positively associates with discretionary disclosure. 
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Shareholders expect more information from larger firms; larger firms have lower collection and 
dissemination cost of voluntary information, and find that voluntary disclosure can help them to 
lower their cost for additional capital from sources outside the firm (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 
2007). Market capitalization and total assets are proxies of size, but because this study uses them 
indirectly in other control variables, and to avoid the undue influence of a single attribute, this 
study instead uses annual sales as a proxy for size, as used in previous governance studies (Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Li et al., 2008). It is expected that firm size strongly, and positively, associates 
with NAHCD.  
Level of debt (LEVERAGE). An increase in leverage can increase the monitoring level 
of the board (Garcia Lara et al., 2007); and associates with greater voluntary disclosures of non-
financial (Eng and Ma, 2003) and intellectual capital (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). Firms 
mitigate the high monitoring costs imposed by greater voluntary disclosure. These monitoring 
costs do not exist for firms that are debt free, and this study expects that the leverage level 
positively associates with NAHCD.  
Level of growth (GROWTH). The market price over the net book value is a proxy for 
growth rate of firms (Smith and Watts, 1992). The high-growth firms have a greater information 
asymmetry and they bridge the information gap by discretionary disclosure to meet investor 
expectations (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Eng and Mak, 2003). Industry sectors distinctly 
characterize as either “old economy with low growth rate” or “new economy with high growth 
rate” sectors (Gerpott, Thomas, and Hoffman, 2008). This study expects that firms high growth 
rate has a positive influence on NAHCD.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
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Annual Reports 
Several studies acknowledge the importance of annual reports as vehicles for discharging 
accountability (Boyne and Law, 1991; Chang and Most, 1985). The annual report is the firm’s 
main communication tool; it has more credibility than other media channels, and is produced 
necessarily and regularly to meet investor requirements (Marston and Shrivers, 1985). The 
annual report presents the board of directors with the challenges of communicating mandatory 
financial results and making discretionary disclosures related to future earnings possibilities from 
resources not recognised in the financial statements (Davison, 2002).  
Human Capital Disclosure Items 
Human capital in this study is comprised of 25 resource items with pre-operational 
definitions: know-how, vocational qualifications, career development, training programs, union 
activity, employee thanked, employee featured, executive compensation plans, other employee 
compensation plans, employee benefits, employee share ownership plans, employee share option 
ownership plans, expert seniority, employee numbers, professional experience, education levels, 
expert seniority, age of employees, entrepreneurship of staff, workplace safety, equity issues 
(gender, race, and religion), equity issues (disability), value-added per expert staff, value added 
per non-expert staff, and staff involvement with the community (Abeysekera, 2007, pp. 79–88; 
Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2004). The human capital represents a volatile intangible base that is a 
major contributor to the development of financial and physical capital (Edvinsson and Malone, 
1997).  
Content Analysis 
 Studies of discretionary disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes, 2004; Gray et 
al., 1995) and studies examining the influence of corporate governance attributes on human 
20 
 
 
 
capital disclosure (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2008) frequently use content analysis 
in data collection from annual reports. This study develops 20 NAHCD items with pre-defined 
operational definitions after pilot testing for relevance with a large listed firm outside this 
sample. It then identifies NAHCD from annual reports of firms in the study sample, looking for 
meanings (latent content analysis) that meet pre-operational definitions. Two coders who are 
experienced in content analysis identified NAHCD by frequency of occurrence in the annual 
report of each firm, recording 1 for each occurrence and 0 for no occurrence. The NAHCD for a 
firm was the total frequency of 20 resource items in its annual report. The coding of content by 
two coders allowed measurement of the degree of agreement as a measure of reliability, using 
Scott’s π (greater than 0.9). 
The study examines NAHCD in the entire annual reports of the top 30 firms by market 
capitalization in the CSE from 1998 to 2006 (nine years). The total sample size is 253, after 
removing a few firms from the dataset due to delisting or inability to obtain their annual reports. 
Firms removed from the sample comprised two in 1998, two in 1999, one in 2000, one in 2001, 
three in 2002, three in 2003, two in 2004, and one in 2005.  
Measurement of Variables 
The study includes NAHCD as the dependent variable to examine the relationship 
between the level of disclosure and corporate governance attributes. It investigates two corporate 
governance attributes: B-BALANCE, and N-IDIR-RCOM. The study obtains data from firms’ 
annual reports and the Colombo Stock Exchange database. Table 1 summarizes the 
operationalizing of both the dependent and predictor variables. The following regression 
equation tests results by pooling firms across nine years using within-effect estimation in a panel 
dataset (Hausman, 1978).  
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Dependent Variable it = b0+b1B-BALANCEit +b2N-IDIR-RCOMit +b3B-SIZEit +b4N-IDIR-
ACOMit + b5 N-MEETit +b6 SIZEit + b7 LEVERAGEit + b8 GROWTHit +z  
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 outlines the descriptive statistics. The independent directors dominate the boards 
and exceed the benchmark of one-third representation set by the best-practice code. On average, 
two independent directors serve on the audit committees. On average, the boards meet six to 
seven times a year, which is above the best-practice code’s benchmark of four times a year. A 
board of directors has an average of eight members. A small number of independent directors are 
represented in remuneration committees (mean =1.2, standard deviation =1.6) compared to 
independent directors represented on the board (B-SIZE mean =7.9, and B-BALANCE mean 
=0.67), pointing to it being the involvement of independent directors in remuneration committees 
that adds value as a resource for NAHCD. 
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
Appendix presents the correlation matrix with NAHCD, governance attributes, and 
control variables. The correlation values are low, and indicate no multicollinearity. The number 
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of independent directors on the remuneration committee shows a positive significant correlation 
with NAHCD. The proportion of independent directors’ shows a positive but not significant 
correlation with NAHCD. All governance related control variables show a positive correlation 
with NAHCD. The growth-control variable although positive in value, but is not significant for 
NAHCD. The size variable has a significant and positive correlation, indicating that larger firms 
make more NAHCD. Firms with smaller boards have a higher proportion of independent 
directors.  
 
Panel Data Regression Analysis 
Table 3 shows the pooled firms across nine years using within-effect estimation (fixed-
effect regression) results for NAHCD (within-effect R
2
=0.178, probability F=0.001). The results 
show that the proportion of independent directors representing the board does not influence the 
level of NAHCD, a finding that is inconsistent with H1. This might have been because some 
independent directors are involved in board-appointed committees helping the board in 
determining NAHCD, while other independent directors are not. The number of independent 
directors on the remuneration committee positively associates with the level of NAHCD, which 
is consistent with H2. The involvement of independent directors on the remuneration committee 
is a value-adding resource to the board, helping the board to disclose NAHCD to inform 
shareholders about future earnings, and thereby supporting a sound corporate governance system 
(Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). The board size measured by the total number of directors 
positively influences the level of NAHCD. The mean B-SIZE of 7.8 in this study is consistent 
with the optimal board size proposed by Jensen (1993), and is well within the mean board size 
recommended by the Olivencia Report (Garcia Lara et al., 2007). Although this study expected a 
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weak positive association, the number of independent directors on the audit committee shows no 
influence on NAHCD. This confirms that the role of the audit committee is primarily informing 
about financial reporting to the board in the presence of a remuneration committee (Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Laux and Laux, 2009; McMuller, 1996). The number of meetings has no influence 
on the levels of NAHCD. Although the board meets on average eight times a year, more than the 
number of meetings stipulated by the best-practice code, the higher frequency of board meetings, 
a monitoring activity, does not help NAHCD. As predicted, the firm size positively associates 
with NAHCD. On the contrary to a predicted positive association, this study found no significant 
relationship between leverage and NAHCD. Since the sample firms have positive net asset 
balances, it may have lead to the no relationship between leverage and NAHCD. Although the 
growth rate of firms was predicted to have a weak positive association with NAHCD; in this 
study has no influence on NAHCD. This might have been influenced by the low growth rates of 
firms in the sample. The high-growth technological sector is insignificant in Sri Lanka, with only 
one telecommunication firm listed since 2003 (included in the sample).   
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
Comparison of findings of this study with previous studies examining NAHCD and 
governance attributes reveals differences in context. For instance, the findings in this study 
contrast with those of Li et al. (2008), who find the presence of independent directors on the 
audit committee to have a positive influence on the level of intellectual-capital disclosure. This 
study does not confirm the assertion by Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) that a higher proportion 
of independent directors influence the human capital disclosure level. The studies of Cerbioni 
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and Parbonetti (2007) in Europe and of Li et al. (2008) in the UK support the agency perspective, 
whereas evidence from this study on NAHCD provides little support for it. Furthermore, the 
differences in objectives and methodologies between this study and those studies may have 
contributed to the differences in results. As noted earlier, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) review 
only the management and discussion sections of the annual reports. Moreover, they count 
disclosure by number of words (i.e., manifest content analysis) to determine the quality and 
quantity of disclosure. Li et al. (2008) measured intellectual-capital disclosure as an index they 
developed. In contrast, this study measures human capital disclosure by the frequency of 
narrative disclosure of each resource item identified in reference to its meaning (latent content 
analysis), rather than aggregated disclosure comprising narrative, visual, and numerical 
information, which was the focus of the aforementioned studies. 
 
Additional Analysis 
Reaction to the increase of the proportion of independent directors on the board 
As shown in Table 4, as additional evidence, this study examines the influence on NAHCD of 
the independent directors in remuneration committees, for firms with different proportions of 
independent directors on the board. The proportion of independent directors greater than 0.2, and 
in increments of 0.2 up to 0.8, is examined as a separate model. The firm size is a significant 
variable, and is consistent with the main model.  As the proportion of independent directors on 
the board increases, the N-IDIR-RCOM coefficient increases (5.43 with independent directors on 
board greater than 0.2, and 6.15 with independent directors on board greater than 0.8), indicating 
that independent directors on remuneration committees have an increasing influence on 
NAHCD.  
---------------------------- 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
Reaction to the absence of independent directors from the remuneration committee and to the 
absence of independent directors from the audit committee 
As further evidence of the influence of independent directors on the remuneration committee, 
this study investigates the relationship between NAHCD and the corporate governance attributes 
if independent directors are absent from the remuneration committee. The results (details not 
shown in the paper) indicate that although the board compositions are similar, the NAHCD level 
is lower (mean =15.1, standard deviation =16.8) for firms without independent directors on 
remuneration committees. The predictor variable B-BALANCE (mean =0.6, standard deviation 
=0.3), and the control variables B-SIZE (mean =7.3, standard deviation =2.5), N-MEET (mean 
=7.6, standard deviation =3.7), and other control variables are similar to the originally 
investigated sample.  The results indicate that in the absence of independent directors on the 
remuneration committee, the independent directors on the audit committee become the servers of 
NAHCD to the board (coefficient =3.38, probability =0.001). The only other significant variable 
is size (coefficient =2.61, probability =0.001). However, the model predictability is extremely 
low (within-effect R
2
=0.013, probability F=0.001). As a separate analysis, the main sample 
disregarded firms without independent directors in the audit committee and the re-run model 
indicated that N-IDIR-RCOM coefficient increases to 19.1 (probability =0.02) compared to the 
main model N-IDIR-RCOM coefficient of 5.09.  
 
Reaction to the minimum board size 
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Garcia Lara et al. (2007), citing the Olivencia Report, note that the effective board size 
should be between 5 and 15. A model run disregarding firms with board sizes below 5 shows 
results similar to the original model (details are not shown here). The within-effect R
2
 is 0.173 
(number of observations =244); the significant variables are B-SIZE (coefficient =1.64, 
probability =0.09), N-IDIR-RCOM (coefficient =5.09, probability =0.001), and SIZE 
(coefficient =6.0, probability =0.001). Findings in this study therefore conform to the optimal 
board size recommended by the Olivencia Report.  
 
Reaction to the maximum board size 
As additional evidence for the influence of the board size, this study investigates the 
relationship between NAHCD and the corporate governance attributes by reducing the board 
size. The maximum board size in this study is 13. The study conducts separate within-effect 
regressions by restricting the maximum board size and excluding observations above the 
maximum board size, first by restricting the maximum board size to 12 (within R
2
=.179); then to 
11 (within R
2
=.175); and finally 10 (within R
2
=.12). The results in all these separate regressions 
are similar to the main study but the model explanatory power shows a decreasing trend with the 
decrease in maximum board size. Although Yermack’s (1996) study observes increasing 
functionality of the board with decreasing board size for corporate performance, which is a 
historical perspective of the firm, this study finds decreasing functionality of the board from 
maximum board size of 13 (mean =7.9, median =8) to 10 (mean =7.3, median =8) for NAHCD, 
which is a futuristic perspective of the firm.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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The findings indicate that the committee—particularly the remuneration committee—has 
a positive impact on the level of NAHCD of the top 30 Sri Lankan listed firms. The proportion 
of independent directors and the number of meetings have no influence on NAHCD, thus 
weakening theoretical support for an agency perspective for this sample of firms. The monitoring 
role of the board in having more board meetings and resolving conflicting agendas between 
shareholders and management had little relevance for NAHCD.  
An important lesson from this study is the limited understanding of NAHCD in the 
context of the remuneration committee and board composition. Heavy reliance on independent 
directors appears to create a knowledge deficit at the board level about firm-specific, forward-
looking human capital information for disclosure—a deficit to address particularly via 
information obtained by independent directors from the remuneration committee. As this study 
demonstrates, independent directors on the remuneration committee facilitate the knowledge 
transfer of firm-specific details of human capital to the board that makes decisions about 
NAHCD.  
The findings of this study have limitations. The study examines only the top 30 listed 
firms; therefore, these findings might not be applicable to all listed firms or to firms not listed on 
the main board. The analysis is limited to annual reports, and integration of firms’ other media 
disclosures might provide more comprehensive information about NAHCD. The “independence” 
of independent directors is assumed as stated in annual reports, since the reports do not 
necessarily warrant the application of criteria for verification. Corporate governance attributes 
not mentioned in the best-practice code and different from this study can influence NAHCD.  
Nevertheless, the findings of this study provide several researchable topics, as there is 
little evidence-based documentation of either governance attributes or numerical disclosure of 
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human capital in a developing-country setting. This study reviews NAHCD as a collection of 20 
resource items, but a future study may examine how corporate governance attributes predict each 
human capital resource item separately. A future study also could examine the governance 
attributes in this study with firms that place less reliance on independent directors. The 
communication of human capital can comprise narrative, visual, and numerical types of 
disclosure. Reasons for the selection of particular disclosure types by firms are wide-ranging but 
include accountability, transparency, and marketability. Photographs, pictures, and charts 
constitute the visual type of human capital disclosure. Studies suggest that visual disclosure can 
manipulate in a manner that gives a better impression than an individual’s interpretation of 
narrative or numerical information alone. Future study may contribute to empirical evidence on 
the “imagined” world of future earnings, as to whether visual disclosure of human capital 
obstructs or facilitates transparency of information from the perspective of corporate governance 
practices. Furthermore, a future study could explore whether implementation of the best-practice 
code of governance effective from 2008 for listed firms in Sri Lanka has a moderating effect on 
NAHCD. As found in this study, some governance attributes of the best-practice code of 
corporate governance have no influence on the level of NAHCD, perhaps because the main 
thrust of the best-practice code is on financial disclosure rather than on aspects of forward-
looking discretionary disclosure.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Correlation matrix of narrative intellectual capital disclosure 
 
  NAHCD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  1         
1 B-BALANCE 0.01 1        
 Pr 0.83         
2 N-IDIR-RCOM 0.43*** 0.11* 1       
 Pr 0.001 0.096        
3  B-SIZE 0.18** -0.12* 0.32*** 1      
 Pr 0.001 0.07 0.001       
4  N-IDIR-ACOM 
0.40*** 0.14** 0.60*** 0.30*** 1     
 Pr 0.001 0.027 0.001 0.001      
5 N-MEET 0.21** 0.17*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 1    
 Pr 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001     
6 SIZE in ln 0.44** -0.07 0.34*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 0.24*** 1   
 Pr 0.001 0.255 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.001    
7 LEVERAGE -0.12* 0.00 -0.11* -0.20*** -0.06 -0.14** -0.34*** 1  
 Pr 0.054 0.962 0.070 0.001 0.370 0.022 0.001   
8 GROWTH 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11* -0.02 -0.19*** -0.05 0.26*** 1 
 Pr  0.687 0.500 0.553 0.087 0.796 0.002 0.432 0.001  
 
Significance: *** at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%. 
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TABLE 1 
Variable Definitions and Measurement 
 
Variable  Proxy Measurement Data source 
Dependent    
NAHCD Total narrative 
human capital 
disclosed 
Total frequency count of narrative 
disclosure of human capital (20 
resource items) 
Annual reports 
Independent    
B-BALANCE Independent 
directors on the 
board 
Proportion of independent directors on 
the board 
Annual reports 
N-IDIR-
RCOM 
Independent 
directors on 
committees other 
than the audit 
committee  
Number of independent directors on the 
remuneration committee 
Annual reports 
Control    
B-SIZE Board size Total number of directors on the board Annual reports 
N-IDIR-
ACOM 
Independent 
directors on the 
audit committee 
Number of independent directors on the 
audit committee 
Annual reports 
N-MEET Board meetings Number of board meetings held in a 
financial year 
Annual reports 
SIZE Size of the firm Natural logarithms of total annual sales  Colombo Stock 
Exchange 
database 
LEVERAGE Level of debt Total assets over total liabilities Annual report 
GROWTH Level of growth Market value of ordinary shares divided 
by book value of ordinary shareholders’ 
equity  
Annual reports 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Overall Sample 
Variable Mean S.D. Median 
NAHCD 
25.2 
 
28.5 
 
15 
B-BALANCE 
0.67 
 
0.3 
 
0.74 
N-IDIR-RCOM 
1.2 
 
1.6 
 
0 
B-SIZE 
7.9 
 
2.4 
 
8 
N-IDIR-ACOM 
2.1 
 
1.7 
 
3 
N-MEET 
7.6 
 
4.0 
 
6 
SIZE (Rs. Mn) (in ln)         
15.2  
 
1.4 
 
15.3 
LEVERAGE 
5.1 
 
20.2 
 
1.9 
GROWTH 
1.2 
 
0.7 
 
1 
Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions.  
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TABLE 3 
Panel data within-effect regression results for NAHCD 
 
 NAHCD NAHCD NAHCD 
 Coefficient Pr Standard error 
B-BALANCE 
-1.97 0.78 
7.03 
N-IDIR-RCOM 
5.09*** 0.00 
1.31 
B-SIZE 
1.49* 0.08 
0.86 
N-IDIR-ACOM 
1.82 0.14 
1.24 
N-MEET 
-0.33 0.47 
0.46 
SIZE (Rs. Mn) in ln 
5.95*** 0.00 
1.77 
LEVERAGE 
0.03 0.74 
0.08 
GROWTH 3.05 0.18 2.26 
CONSTANT -86.45 0.00 28.84 
Within-effect R
2 
0.178   
Probability F 0.001   
Number of observations = 253; Number of groups = 53; Average observation per group = 4.8; 
Significance level: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and at *10%. 
Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions.  
Fixed-effect regression model: 
Dependent Variable it = b0+b1B-BALANCEit +b2N-IDIR-RCOMit +b3B-SIZEit +b4N-IDIR-
ACOMit + b5 N-MEETit +b6 SIZEit + b7 LEVERAGEit + b8 GROWTHit +z  
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TABLE 4 
Panel data within-effect regression results for firms with different proportions of independent 
directors on board 
 
Proportion of 
independent directors 
on the board 
>0.2  >0.4  >0.6  >0.8  
 Coef. Pr Coef. Pr Coef. Pr Coef. Pr 
B-BALANCE 
-7.54 0.37 -24.39* 0.02 -23.86 0.28 -0.13 1.00 
N-IDIR-RCOM 
5.44*** 0.00 5.64*** 0.00 6.06*** 0.00 6.15*** 0.00 
B-SIZE 
1.27 0.16 1.12 0.25 0.96 0.41 0.65 0.63 
N-IDIR-ACOM 
1.56 0.23 1.92 0.18 1.78 0.29 1.95 0.37 
N-MEET 
-0.32 0.51 -0.38 0.49 -0.28 0.72 -0.22 0.82 
SIZE (Rs. Mn) in ln 
5.72*** 0.00 5.81*** 0.00 5.80** 0.01 5.54** 0.02 
LEVERAGE 
0.05 0.60 0.04 0.73 0.02 0.85 0.00 0.98 
GROWTH 2.59 0.28 4.86* 0.08 6.30* 0.06 7.09* 0.05 
CONSTANT -76.00 0.02 -65.72 0.05 -66.04 0.12 -82.57 0.13 
Within-effect R
2 
0.187  0.245  0.227  0.159  
Probability F 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  
Significance level: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and at *10%. 
Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. 
Fixed effect regression model:  
Dependent Variable it = b0+b1B-BALANCEit +b2N-IDIR-RCOMit +b3B-SIZEit +b4N-IDIR-
ACOMit + b5 N-MEETit +b6 SIZEit + b7 LEVERAGEit + b8 GROWTHit +z  
 
 
